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From the Mirror of Reason to the
Measure of Justice
Mary Anne Case*

My goal in this essay is to introduce legal academics to a body of theory on sex equality generated throughout Western Europe from at least
the fourteenth century until the French Revolution. The authors in this
tradition were mostly what we today might call "sameness" feminists;
that is to say, they took the position that all differences between the sexes
apart from those directly connected to reproductive physiology were the
product of education and custom, not of nature. If women were given
the education and opportunities available to men, these writers contended, they would achieve as men have.
Scholars in the humanities, to whom this tradition is generally known
under the rubric "querelle des femmes," have become increasingly familiar with its major works and authors.' Those who search for the first
feminist, for example, are increasingly likely to name not eighteenth-century authors like Mary Wollstonecraft, but Christine de Pizan, whose
* Countless people over many years have made invaluable contributions to my work on early
feminist theory. Since I cannot thank them all here, I shall, like the master of the vineyard
(Matthew 20:1-16) and with apologies to those whose help came early, give what may seem like a
disproportionate share of thanks to those who provided help late in the day. Thus, I am most
grateful to Kenneth Abraham, Margaret Brabant, Karen Cornelius, Clayton Gillette, Laurie
Hollander, Alex Johnson, Jody Kraus, Cliff Landesman, Dayna Matthew, Daniel Ortiz, Todd
Preuss, George Rutherglen, Adina Schwartz, Elizabeth Scott, Paul Stephan, G. Edward White, and
James Q. Whitman for their sensitive and thoughtful comments on drafts; to Michael Cornfield,
Charles Donahue, Jr., Patricia Gill, William La Piana, Michael Radway, and Jonathan Vogel for
sharing their expertise; to Robert Tilewick and Glenn Wallach for logistical help; and to Karen
Balter and Dionne Thompson for research assistance. This essay is part of a larger project on the
history of feminist theory which received its initial funding from the National Endowment for the
Humanities.
1. Although the term "Querelle des Femmes" (literally "Debate about Women") is most
properly used to describe the quasi-antiphonal dialogue between the authors of misogynist texts and
defenders of women, I shall use it in this essay to refer only to the feminist half of the debate. I
realize that the use of the term "feminist" to describe any pre-twentieth-century work is highly
controversial, but I do not have the space in this essay to justify my use of it. Both for background
on the querelle and for an explanation of why it may properly be called "feminist," see Joan Kelly,
"Early Feminist Theory and the Querelle des Femmes, 1400-1789," in Women, History and Theory
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 65-109. While the French generated many of the most
radical defenses of women, the querelle spread throughout Western Europe, from Italy to England,
Spain to Germany. Querelle texts are generally polemical, but they take a variety of forms, including
book-length manuscripts, poems, essays, stories, and dialogues.
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City of Ladies dates from 1405, or Marie de Gournay, who published
"On the Equality of Men and Women" in 1622. But despite what I
believe to be interesting parallels to continuing debates in the legal academy, the querelle tradition seems to have gone virtually unnoticed by
legal theorists. After outlining the parameters of the querelle, I will
briefly attempt to draw a few of these parallels to the circumstances surrounding the prohibition of sex discrimination under Title VII and to the
use of "voice" and narrative in critical race and feminist theory. The
former is usually considered to be an anomaly, the latter a new thing
under the sun; my hope is to situate them instead in the context of a
centuries-old tradition.
The men and women who wrote on the equality of the sexes before
1800 regularly made use of all kinds of narrative and had developed several intriguing theoretical frameworks for its use by the end of the fourteenth century. Many of them learned the power of narrative
imaginatively to invoke hitherto unthinkable alternative worlds, for
example ones in which women demanded and obtained equality under
law; though these imaginative narratives may have begun as
carnavalesque jokes, they could ultimately serve to facilitate innovation
in theory and behavior. Querelle writers had also learned that what Matsuda2 has called an "outsider" perspective is just as importantly an
"insider" perspective-a characteristic of subordinated groups is that
they are spoken about, described, and defined by "outside experts" from
the dominant group; the "inside story" from a member of the group discussed can thus be a powerful corrective to the authority of these experts.
As Christine de Pizan pointed out, "[A]s a woman... I can bear better
witness than those who have no experience of the state but speak only in
suppositions or in general terms." Finally, in the use they made of the
stories of exceptional women, the early proponents of women's equality
demonstrated the logical and rhetorical force of even a single counterexample. Unlike their opponents, they regarded such exceptional women
not as freaks, but rather as exemplary; they realized that the exception
did indeed prove the rule, in the original sense of testing its limits; thus,
for even one woman to succeed in any activity proved conclusively that
such an activity was within the natural capacities of womankind. As
modern-day jurisprudence struggles with the limits of the uses of narrative, it may be well to remember the uses to which our predecessors put
women's stories.' Additionally, although the outlines can only be
2. Mari Matsuda, "Public Responses to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,"
Michigan Law Review 87 (1989): 2323.
3. Although I know of no clear precedent for the use in the querelle of what we would call
"voice," many of the other techniques here discussed were not, of course, unique to the querelle.
Argument from example and some of the rhetorical forms I shall be discussing were common in the
Renaissance and, indeed, in classical times. I hope to show, however, that they can take on a special
force in the debate on women.
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sketched below, I believe the querelle makes a good case study of the
nature of authority and the forms of proof in argument.
In seeking to bring the querelle tradition to the legal academy, I am, in
a sense, returning it whence it came: one of the first women on record as
defending the equality of the sexes came from a famous family of law
professors and, it is said, taught law herself. Novella, daughter of the
noted fourteenth-century canonist Johannes Andreae, is best known to
later ages from the oft-repeated story of her lecturing from behind a curtain, so that law students at the University of Bologna would not be distracted by her beauty.4 Her defense of her sex and its abilities is far less
widely reported. According to a French contemporary, however,
Novella undertook to prove "scientifically in a public lecture that women
are equal to men... She put forth more than seventy reasons [which
were] so convincing that no man could dispute them." 5
While her reasons have not come down to us, there is good cause to
think that many were not original to her. Instead, Novella's may be the
first female voice to enter a debate on the capacities of women that men
had been conducting for generations.
Though female authors were proportionally better represented in the
genre of the querelle than in other types of Renaissance polemical and
theoretical writing, the vast majority of defenses of women, like the vast
majority of all works on any subject written before 1800, were written by
males. Indeed, male authors produced some of the most interesting and
most radical advocacy of women's rights and abilities. Ignoring their
contribution gives the misleading impression that only women could or
did concern themselves with the question of the equality of the sexes.
That said, there remains, as will be shown below, good reason to question the intent behind most texts written by men in support of women.
Discerning the true motive behind texts on their face favorable to women
is often difficult. Not only did serious writers try to pass off their most
4. The story appears, for example, in Christine de Pizan, The Book of the City of Ladies, trans.
Earl Jeffrey Richards (New York: Persea Books, 1982) 11.36.3. While I concede it may well be
apocryphal, I nevertheless find it intriguing to see it accepted by contemporaries and near
contemporaries. To Novella herself, I am, however, unwilling to concede mere apocryphal status,
despite the remarkable coincidence of her name with that of her father's most famous work, the
Novella super decretalium.
5. I am here loosely translating "La fille maistre Jehan Andrieu, / Qui lisoit les lois et les drois, /
Se leva matin une fois, / Pour monstrer par vraye science Devant tous en plaine audience / Que
femme est a l'omme pareille, / Et proposa mainte merveille / Pour l'onneur des femmes garder / Et
pour leur blasme retarder. / Tous le jour dura sa lecture / Jusques bien pros de nuit obscure. / Des
raisons mist plus de soissante, / voire, ce croy, plus de septante, / Et si bien y continua / Qu'homme
ne 'en redargua." A literal translation might read, "The daughter of Master Johannes Andreae,
who lectured on law, got up one morning to demonstrate by true learning before all in a public
lecture that woman is equal to man and she presented many marvels to defend the honor of women
and to diminish their blame. Her lecture lasted all day until almost nightfall. She put forth more
than sixty reasons, indeed, I believe, more than seventy, and went on so well that man could not
dispute them." Jehan Le Fivre, Le Livre de Leesce 11. 1145-54, in vol. 2, Les Lamentations de
Matheolus, ed. A.G. Van Hamel (Paris 1905).
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radical ideas as mere jokes, texts that on their face give no hint that they
are not in deadly earnest are often purely facetious and the ambiguity of
others may be a sign of the ambivalence of their authors. When the face
of a text gives few clues as to its author's true intentions, one can look for
clues in biographical information, an author's other works, and the general historical context. Not surprisingly, all the works by male authors
and few, if any, of those by female authors may, when examined in the
light of such external evidence, be considered suspect. At best, the male
authors showed few signs of putting their feminist rhetoric into practice;
at worst, they came close to contradicting it in other writings. It is
predominantly, though not exclusively, the male authors who distance
themselves from their expression of feminist sentiments by choosing
forms such as the dialogue or declamation, discussed below.
While I find it useful to test the depth of the men's commitment to the
feminist position they espouse, I do not think their works should be dismissed even when the intent behind them is suspect. For even if the male
authors were not themselves feminist, their works were. The reaction of
an author's contemporaries to a given work may be even more difficult
for a modem scholar to discover than is an individual author's intent.
But there is evidence to indicate that contemporary readers even of frivolous texts on women's issues often failed to get the joke. In some cases,
seemingly frivolous texts drew serious refutations, apparently from readers who had taken them at face value. 6 In others, authors who probably
intended chiefly to amuse with their advocacy of women found themselves cited in support of the views of more serious feminists.
The ideas expressed by male authors, even in jest, were ones that
women could and did adopt and run with.7 Moreover, even in the
6. The most notorious example of this contemporary confusion was a lengthy debate sparked by
an anonymous misogynist pamphlet of 1595 commonly attributed to Vales Acidalius and entitled
Disputatio nova contra mulieres quaprobator eas homines non esse. On the basis of biblical exegesis,
the author attempted to prove that women are not human. He claimed his only purpose was to
mock the excesses of Anabaptist biblical interpretation and his disputation is indeed funny, with
none of the virulence of traditional misogyny. If the author's protestations of innocent intent are
sincere, his very choice of subject might show how far women had come-by 1595 the claim that
women were not human had become absurd, more absurd than the claim that Christ was not God,
which inspired the treatise in the first place. Unfortunately, the disputation may have been taken
more seriously than its author intended. It was condemned in churches and universities across
Europe and in very short order provoked a response: also in 1595, a German cleric Simon Gedicus
(or Gedik) wrote a dead-serious Defense of the Female Sex (Defensio Sexus Muliebris, opposita
futilissimae disputationis recens editae quae suppresso Authoris et Typographi nomine blaspheme
contenditur mulieres homines non esse) also printed as Mulier Homo (Woman Human). Gedik is
almost always dismissed as a rather slow-witted pedant who couldn't take a joke. But it is possible
he correctly perceived a real danger in the assertion that women were not human; he may have been
the predecessor of those who refuse to find jokes about minority groups funny. Contra Mulieres was
widely translated and imitated, perhaps by those who secretly approved of its misogynist
implications. See, e.g., Marc Angenot, Les Champions des Femmes (Montreal: P.U.Q., 1977), 27;
Manfred Fleischer, Spaethumanismus in Schlesien (Silesia 1984), 190-212.
7. For example, when Montaigne claims that "[w]omen are not wrong at all when they reject the
rules of life that have been introduced into the world, inasmuch as it is the men who have made these
without them," the context is merely an endorsement of sexual license for the "incomparably more
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absence of direct influence, the arguments used by near contemporaries
such as Jean le Fivre and Christine de Pizan in the fourteenth century,
Marie le Jars de Gournay and Frangois Poulain de la Barre in the seventeenth, are not substantially different; what differs is something more
subtle-the mood. It is this shift in mood from male to female writers
that I have tried to capture in the title of this essay. I take my title from
the opening chapters of Christine de Pizan's City of Ladies, in which the
narrator, "Christine," made despondent by the consistency with which
male authorities denigrated women, reproaches God for "not let[ting] me
be born into the world male so that... I would be as perfect as a person
of the male sex is said to be." In answer to her prayer comes a waking
vision of three "daughters of God"-Reason, Rectitude, and Justice.
Together, Christine and the "three crowned ladies" will refute the misogynists' charges and build a well-defended city to protect women from any
future assaults. Reason, Rectitude and Justice will each play a different
role in the building of the City. The mirror held by Reason will "show
...men

and women.., their error," providing "clear self-knowledge"

and knowledge, as well, of the "essences, qualities, proportions and measures of all things;" she will give Christine the rhetorical tools to clear
away the rubble of misogyny from the field of learning. Rectitude uses
her ruler to separate right from wrong, good from evil. Justice's measure
gives to all their rightful portion; she will complete the City and populate
it with women in need of refuge from unjust attack.' The progress from
male to female feminists in the querelle, I would argue, is much like that
from the mirror of Reason to the measure of Justice, that is to say, from
abstract argument intended at most to produce a clearer vision of sex/
gender relations to rhetoric in a voice unambiguously intended, not only
to persuade, but, by persuading, to change the conditions of women's
lives.9
THE MALE PARTICIPANTS AND THE GAME OF FEMINISM

The particular form of advocacy represented by the querelle had its
roots in a rhetorical tradition that encouraged displays of debating skill
for their own sake rather than to persuade or express deeply held convictions. Some of the early predecessors of the genre, thirteenth- and fourteenth-century vernacular poems in praise or defense of women almost
ardent" female sex. But his covenant daughter, Marie de Gournay, repeatedly cites him as a
supporter of her cause and broadens his arguments to include all relations between the sexes, in the
church and civil society as well as in marriage. Michel de Montaigne, "On some verses of Virgil," in
The Complete Essays, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 651.
8. Christine de Pizan, City of Ladies, 1.3.1-1.6.1.
9. I do not by any means intend to suggest that reason is a peculiarly male attribute nor (pace
Carol Gilligan) that women embody an ethic of justice. Rather, the contrast I wish to draw is less
between Reason and Justice than between a mirror and a measure, that is, between a tool for
reflection and one for action.
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certainly written by men, are often found bound together in manuscripts
with poems of equal vigor condemning women.10 By Novella's time
many of the arguments in favor of women had become so commonplace
they could be summarized in schematic outline form." And by 1370, a
character in Boccaccio's Corbaccio wearily lists the arguments he is tired
of women making in their own behalf. 2 Later, the style of "pour et
contre" was developed in dialogues where advocates of both men and
women had their say without coming to a resolution. 13 Even writers
such as Jean Le Fvre and Poulain de la Barre,' 4 who assert that women
ought to win the debate, continue to dilute their advocacy by first
presenting the misogynists' case at great length.
Even when defenses of women were not coupled with condemnations,
the forms in which they were written call their seriousness into question.
Many were cast as declamations or paradoxes, rhetorical forms in which
the speaker shows off his skill by taking a position so contrary to common sense and popular opinion that only an accomplished rhetorician
could begin to find arguments in its favor. Although accomplished rhetoricians often used forms such as the declamation to show off their skill,
they were in essence mere exercises, part of every schoolboy's training.
In manuals of popular topics for declamation and paradox, the defense
of women ranks beside praises of blindness, poverty, and stupidity. 5
10. See P. Meyer, "Plaidoyer en faveur des femmes" in Romania VI (1877), 501 (collecting
anonymous Latin and vernacular thirteenth- and fourteenth-century defenses of women); Alcuin
Blamires, Woman Defamed and Woman Defended,An Anthology of Medieval Texts (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992). Blamires's anthology includes much earlier texts, such as Marbod of
Rennes's pendant prose works "De Meretrice" (attacking bad women) and "De Matrona"
(defending good ones), written circa 1100 as part of the Liber Decem Capitulorum.
11. One such Latin outline is reprinted in Meyer, "Plaidoyer." Like many querelle texts, it
focuses chiefly on arguments unconvincing to most modern readers, such as evidence from scripture
about the noble place, time, and material out of which woman was created and the exalted role the
Virgin Mary and Mary Magdalene play in salvation history.
12. Giovanni Boccaccio, The Corbaccio, trans. Anthony K. Cassell (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1975), 32 ("So brazen are they that they say straight off to anyone who belittles their
intellect one jot, 'And weren't the Sibyls wise?'-just as if every one of them should be the eleventh
... they say that all good things are of the feminine gender: the stars, planets, Muses.... Further,
they often boast far more thoughtlessly, saying that [the Virgin Mary] ... was a woman like them,
along with a few others-not many, however-of whose virtue the Church of God makes special
mention. . . . For this women imagine they must be respected ....
" Each of these points is
immediately answered by a virulent misogynist counterattack.).
13. Among the Renaissance works in this form are Martin Le Franc's Champion des dames
(1485) and Guilaume Alexis's Debat de l'homme et de lafemme (1493). More famous examples in
this vein include Book III of Castiglione's Courtier (debating the natural abilities and desirable
qualities of a lady of the court) and Erasmus's Colloquies "The New Mother" and "The Abbot and
the Learned Lady" (in which the latter warns, "[I]f you're not careful, the net result will be that
we'll preside in the theological schools, preach in the churches and wear your miters").
14. Poulain (or Poullain) was the author of De l'dgalitddes deux sexe discoursphysique et moral
oz2 l'on voit l'importancede se defaire des prjugez (1673; reprint, Toulouse: Universit6 de Toulouse le
Mirail, 1983); De l'excellence des hommes contre l'dgalitd des sexes (Paris 1675) and De l'education
des dames (1674; reprint, Paris: Fayard, 1984). For an English translation of De l'dgalitd des deux
sexes, see A.L., trans., and Gerald McLean, ed., The Woman as Good as the Man (1677; reprint,
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988) and A. Daniel Frankforter and Paul J. Morman,
trans., The Equality of the Two Sexes (Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 1989).
15. A 1553 handbook, Paradoxes by Charles Estienne, gives sample declamations on some of the
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Since learning to argue any side of any question has been a part of legal
education from the time of the sophists, any law student who has ever
been asked to argue in class that people should be allowed to sell themselves into slavery will have some feel for the flavor of the genre.'
But the nature of the declamation made it ideally suited for serious
advocacy of unpopular or eccentric propositions such as the equality of
the sexes. Because it was traditionally defined as "mere rhetoric," it gave
those afraid to espouse dangerous ideas in their own name a mask to hide
behind. The declamation thus was the form of choice for speakers with
dangerous points of view-if questioned, they could claim their heretical
or subversive statements were just a joke.'"
The purest example of declamation among the texts of the querelle,
Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim's 1509 "Declamation on the
Nobility and Superiority of the Female Sex," is more remarkable for its
widespread influence than for the originality or subversiveness of its sentiments. 18 Yet there is a radical undercurrent in the defense of women.
Serious commitment to the notion that the sexes are equal might lead to
a total restructuring of society. Women might indeed, despite Poulain's
reassurance, "rise up against men" who do not "treat them as their
equals or partners." Although he stops short of demanding a change in
the laws, Agrippa himself fulminates against "the tyranny and ambition
of men [who] have seized the upper hand, contrary to divine and natural
law; . . . women's original liberty has today been forbidden them by
unjust laws, suppressed by custom and usage, extinguished by
education."' 19
Even if the revolution to be brought about is one in thought alone and
not in social structures, dangerous analogies to other forms of prejudice
most popular subjects, including that it is better to be blind than to have sight, that it is better to be
poor than rich, and, number 23, "Pour les Femmes" ("In favor of Women"). No. 23 begins on a far
from militant note, maintaining that women are superior notwithstanding their frailty and "certain
tiny little faults," but it generally recites all the familiar commonplaces such as the evidence of
woman's beauty, constancy, and charm, the substance from which she was created, the noble deeds
of famous heroines, etc. These commonplaces were codified in 1606, in a work whose title
demonstrates the continuing popularity of the praise of woman as a subject for rhetorical exercise;
Nicodemus Frischlin, Methodus declamandiin laudatione,thesi de laudibus mulierum demonstrate.
And while Estienne insists in a cautionary preface that the reader should not be surprised or
offended if he is personally convinced of an opinion that differs from the popular one, the paradoxes
remain exercises behind which stand no intellectual or emotional commitment.
16. Since the time of the ancient skeptics, however, such displays had also been used to throw
into serious question the foundations of belief. See, e.g., Sextus Empiricus, The Outlines of
Pyrrhonism, PH I 8.
17. This was especially important in an age when any independent thinker was likely to face
prosecution for heresy. Erasmus's "Praise of Folly" is doubtless the most famous of such halfserious Renaissance declamations.
18. Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, Declamatio de Nobilitate et Praecellentia
Foeminei Sexus, facsimile reprinted in Opera II (Darmstadt: Olms, 1970); facsimile reprint of 1670
English translation titled Female Preeminence, in Diane Bornstein, The Feminist Controversy of the
Renaissance (Delmar, N.Y.: Scholars' Facsimiles, 1980). Unless otherwise noted, all translations
from Agrippa are my own.
19. To similar effect, see, e.g., Poulain, Equality, 138 ff.
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and oppression are possible: if women need be neither subject to men nor
confined to their households, then perhaps nothing need be as it isfeminist sentiments bear within them an implicit critique of the entire
political and social order, of ethnocentrism, of intellectual and religious
authority. If all we believe with respect to women has no support beyond
custom, is our opinion on other matters, our belief in the religion of our
ancestors, for example, any more solidly based?2 0 If all laws and pronouncements with respect to women are the result either of blind prejudice or of the cynical conspiracy of men seeking to keep power in their
own hands, what of the laws of Church or state that keep prelates and
princes in power? 2 1 Is the inferiority of peasant to king, savage to22civilized European, any more "natural" than that of woman to man?
As noted above, these potentially subversive suggestions most often
took the form of stressing the oppressive and distorting effects of custom
on persons who were by nature equal and alike (that is, an argument
from "sameness"). When querelle authors did acknowledge differences
between the sexes, they could exploit these as well for their subversive
potential. Poulain could, for example, unfavorably compare men's insistence on domination with women's nurturing and pacific qualities;
Agrippa of Nettesheim could contrast the Christ-like virtue in women's
humbleness and simplicity with the Pharisaical tendencies of an overly
sophisticated male clerical hierarchy.
Especially when presented as the vanguard for broader propositions,
the view that men and women are equal might well have been one from
which cautious writers might seek to distance themselves. Thus, Poulain, who drew the analogies explicitly, may have had in mind the troubles his master Descartes had with inquisitorial authorities when he
sought to calm a "panic terror" in his readers and begged those "who are
shocked by this discourse for whatever reason [to] quarrel with truth and
not with the author and . . . say to [them]selves it is nothing but a
witticism."

Not surprisingly, the most difficult problems of interpretation are
presented by those texts showing women claiming entitlement to full
political and legal rights in a world in which such claims were far from
20.

See, e.g., Poulain de la Barre, The Woman as Good as the Man or the Equality of Both Sexes,

AL 64.
21.

See, e.g., Marie de Gournay, "The Equality of Men and Women," in Women Writers of the

Seventeenth Century, ed. Katharina M. Wilson and Frank J. Warnke, trans. Maya Bijvoet (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1989), 14-23.
22. See, e.g., Christine de Pizan, City of Ladies, 1.27.1 (nature has provided peasants and
apparently savage people with the same qualities of mind as the most learned; only lack of education

accounts for differences between them); Poulain de la Barre, "Remarks Necessary to Clear up
Several Difficulties Concerning the Equality of the Sexes . . . " in De l'excellence des hommes
(valuing women less than men is unjust for the same reason as is "esteem[ing] artisans, farmers and
merchants less than the nobles who do nothing"-in both cases the more productive should be more
highly valued).
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uncontroversial even when made on behalf of men. What are we to make,
for example, of Marivaux's "Colony," a play about an unsuccessful
attempt by a group of women to join their men in making laws and electing leaders, written at a time of active censorship decades before most
French males had much role in determining the laws or the ruler that
governed them? 23 Is Marivaux mocking women who seek democratic
rights, men who deny them, men who seek them, rulers who deny them,
or all or none of the above? Or what of Madonna Filippa, the heroine of
the seventh story told on the sixth day of Boccaccio's Decameron, who,
when tried for adultery, successfully defends herself by arguing, inter
alia,
as I am sure you will know, every man and woman should be equal
before the law, and laws must have the consent of those who are
affected by them. These conditions are not fulfilled in the present
instance, because this law only applies to us poor women, who are
much better able than men to bestow our favors liberally. Moreover, when this law was made, no woman gave her consent to it, nor
was any woman even so much as consulted. It can therefore justly
be described as a very bad law.24
On one level, Boccaccio is filling Madonna Filippa's mouth with medieval commonplaces. "Quod omnes tangit. . ." ("What touches all must
be approved by all") was a familiar maxim of medieval law.2 But even in
the Italian city-states of Boccaccio's day, it was not generally extended to
require the participation and consent of the governed as a condition for
the legitimacy of criminal legislation. Nor, in a world where legal rights
varied by class as well as sex, was there much content to the notion that
all men, let alone women, "should be equal before the law." Of what
significance is it, then, that, though the magistrates laugh at Madonna
Filippa's arguments, they also appear to accept them in setting her free?
As Natalie Zemon Davis has shrewdly observed, the image of the
woman on top (or indeed, anywhere but underneath) was a multivalent
one. Like all other carnivalesque inversions, it could serve to reinforce a
hierarchical status quo, but it could also serve to "widen behavioral
options for women," "sanction riot and political disobedience for both
men and women," and "facilitate innovation in historical theory and
political behavior."2 6
23. Pierre de Marivaux, "La nouvelle colonie ou la ligue des femmes" (Paris 1729, 1750);
reprinted in Thiatre complet (Paris: Seuil, 1964), 261-73.
24. Giovanni Boccaccio, The Decameron, trans. G.H. McWilliam (London: Penguin, 1972), 500.

25.

See, e.g., Gaines Post, "A Roman Theory of Consent, Quod Onmes Tangit, in Medieval

Representation," Wisconsin Law Review (1950): 68; Yves Congar, "Quod Omnes Tangit Ab
Omnibus Tractari et Approbari Debet," in Rdvue historique de droitfrangaiset itranger,4th ser. 36
(1958): 210-59. I am grateful to Jennifer Rondeau and Jim Blythe for helping me identify this

maxim.
26. "Women on Top," in Society and Culture in Early Modern France,Eight Essays by Natalie
Zemon Davis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 124-51.
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This historical account of serious claims for women's equality with
their roots in male satire may help us better to understand similar phenomena in present day legal culture. After all, Title VII's prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex resulted from a similar bit of game
playing. During the House debates, it was Representative Howard W.
Smith, an unrepentant opponent of laws prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, who introduced the amendment adding the word "sex"
to the list of characteristics on the basis of which discrimination would
be forbidden.2 7 Smith's true motives are as difficult to discern, and perhaps as complex, as those of his European predecessors. It is generally
assumed that for Smith, as for many male writers of the querelle,
women's equality was a reductio ad absurdum.28 He certainly would not
have been sorry to see his amendment kill the entire civil rights bill. In a
tone quite reminiscent of some earlier male advocates, Smith sought to
demonstrate that "women have some real grievances" by reading a letter
from a disgruntled spinster constituent who asked for government assistance in catching a man.2 9 Smith insisted nearly half a dozen times that
he was "serious" in proposing his amendment and there is some evidence
to support his claim-he had, for example, been a sponsor of the E.R.A.
since 1945.30 Yet those colleagues who criticized him in the debate for
27. My sources for the events leading up to the inclusion of the word "sex" in Title VII include:
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (Washington, D.C. 1968), 3213-32; Charles and Barbara Whalen, The
Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (New York: New American
Library 1985), 116-19; Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of
National Policy 1960-1972 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 134-39; Carl M. Brauer,
"Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act," Journal of Southern History XLIX (1983): 37-56; and personal
communication with Catherine Bedell, the former Congresswoman Catherine May, who participated
in the House debates. I am particularly grateful to the latter for sharing her recollections and her
enthusiasm for the cause of women with me.
28. For this the closest parallel might be the French Revolutionary documents Paule Duhet has
called "false petitions of true grievances." Duhet, Les Femmes et la Rdvolution (Paris: Archives
Julliard, 1977). Some of these pamphlets are obviously satiric, but others make demands that are
virtually indistinguishable from those made by serious feminists-the vote, education, job
opportunities, the full exercise of civil rights, an end to the tyranny of males in the family. But they
undercut these demands by their tone, or occasionally by no more than hints as subtle as their place
of publication (the "Chateau of Contradictions," for example). Their arguments, too, and the case
histories they relate are also little different from serious feminist polemic. Indeed, modern scholars
still disagree violently about which such pamphlets were intended to be taken seriously. In earlier
centuries, similar parodies had given feminists new arguments. But the effect of such pamphlets for
the Revolution was the opposite-they prepared the public to see feminism itself as a joke. Though
in 1789, with the world turned topsy-turvy, the only order to be criticized covertly was a brand new
one, the joke of feminism could still have a subversive thrust if the demand for women's rights is seen
as a reductio ad absurdum of the male political revolution.
29. The constituent's complaint was that an already large disparity between the numbers of
eligible men and women had been further increased by government-sponsored wars in which many
men died. She asked for "a bill to correct the present 'imbalance' which exists between males and
females in the United States."
30. Smith had a record of sympathy for the aims of the National Woman's Party (N.W.P.)
which "generally represented the views of elite, white, affluent, professional and highly educated
women" and which "had pushed single-mindedly for the ERA since 1923." Graham, The Civil
Rights Era, 136.
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"levity" and "making jokes" could perhaps hear the sarcasm in a "voice
dripping honey." Whatever his intentions, Smith found his proposal
indeed treated seriously. His position, like those of his predecessors, was
enthusiastically taken up by women. After Emanuel Celler, a liberal on
civil rights with an old-fashioned view of women,31 opposed Smith's
amendment in a one-liner filled speech on biological differences between
the sexes, Democrat Martha Griffiths of Michigan retorted, "[I]f there
had been any necessity to have pointed out that women were a secondclass sex, the laughter would have proved it." "I can think of nothing
more logical than this amendment at this point .... [W]e are entitled to
this little crumb of equality," insisted New York Republican Congresswoman Katherine St. George, another of a bipartisan coalition of five
congresswomen who rose in support of Smith's amendment.3 2 When the
amendment passed, to the surprise of all and the consternation of some
of the original bill's supporters, a cry of "We've won!" went up from a
woman in the spectator gallery, who was promptly ejected.
For Smith and his ilk, the mirror of reason could look like a funhouse
mirror, distorting and alternately frightening or amusing. But in the light
of this mirror, the women of the House, like the women of the querelle
before them, could see clearly and demand the full measure of their
rights.
THE FEMALE PARTICIPANTS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
WOMAN'S VOICE

Just as Smith may be seen as the descendant of the men of the querelle,
the women of the House who spoke in support of his amendment and
those of the National Woman's Party who urged him on may trace their
heritage through Novella and her early modern successors. In matters
apart from women's rights, these women could be characterized as moderate to conservative.3 3 Similarly, most women of the querele were con31. "It is rather anomolous that two men of our age should be on opposite sides of this
question," Celler told Smith. "I'm sure we are not," the wily Southerner responded. Taken in the
narrow context of the House debates, Smith's remark can be taken to imply merely that Celler might
have supported Smith's amendment but for an agreement not to further alter the draft of the bill. In
a broader context, given that Celler repeatedly blocked the E.R.A. from leaving his Judiciary
Committee, the remark could be an ironic allusion to Smith's own insincerity.
32. The others were Frances Bolton (R-Ohio), Martha Griffiths (D-Michigan), Catherine May
(R-Washington), and Edna Kelly (D-New York). While the Whalens describe these women's
support for the bill as arising "in a spontaneous spirit of sisterhood," the group comprised long time
supporters of women's rights legislation, including the E.R.A. and the Equal Pay Act. Whalen, The
Longest Debate, 118. Indeed, according to then Congresswoman May, they had already gone to the
Rules Committee to urge inclusion of the word "sex" and had been surprised by how readily
Committee Chairman Smith, albeit for his own devious purposes, had fallen in with their proposal.
"He's welcome to the credit," she said. "We just wanted to win." Indignant at Emanuel Celler's
criticism of Smith's amendment as "illogical," these women insisted on its logic as often as Smith did
on its seriousness.

33. One of the most liberal women in the 1964 House, Edith Green, was also the only woman to
speak out against the inclusion of sex in Title VII. Although she had previously sponsored the Equal
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sidered by their contemporaries to have moderate to conservative views
on matters ranging from religion and politics to grammar: a4 Christine de
Pisan, for example, is alternately praised and condemned by modern
scholars for counseling moderation to those disadvantaged by the status
quo; 5 Marie de Gournay fought a rear-guard action against the reforms
of the French Academy and was satirized in her lifetime as a specter
from a vanished age; Mary Astell was a pious Tory; Olympe de Gouges's
support of constitutional monarchy at the height of the French Revolution led to her execution.
The women authors, unlike the men, became feminists by necessityin defending their sex they were defending themselves. a6 What they
sought, above all, was the right to be taken seriously. Each pursued a
career as an intellectual. Like the women of the 1964 Congress, whose
principal legislative agendas ranged from farm policy to health care, each
wished to express her opinion on many other topics besides the equality
of the sexes.3 7 But each of the women of the querelle found that whatever
she had to say on any subject could be dismissed with "just a smile or a
shake of the head [that says] with mute eloquence . . . 'It's a woman
talking.'" As women they were prohibited "all action, all judgment, and
all true speech, and the authority to be believed, or at least to be
Pay Act, she took the position that discrimination against women could not be compared with
discrimination against blacks and should not be allowed to "clutter up" a bill designed to remedy
race discrimination. By contrast, the proponents of Smith's amendment characterized it as
protecting the only group they felt was not covered by the original draft-the "white, native-born
Christian women" who were the "mothers, daughters, sisters, wives and widows" of the white men
in the House. They may have done this for strategic reasons, to attract the Southern conservative
vote crucial to the amendment's passage; they may have had the racist tendencies occasionally
attributed to organizations such as the N.W.P. They might, however, have simply been attempting
accurately to describe the scope of the proposed bill, which, by prohibiting discrimination on
grounds of race, religion, and national origin, could indeed be seen to give a claim to all classes of
workers liable to suffer discrimination except women who were not also members of a minority
group.
34. This was not true of the men. Many of the most radical of the early male advocates of
women tended to hold other views deemed by their contemporaries to be more than mildly
subversive-Agrippa of Nettesheim, for example, was accused of heresy; Poulain de la Barre, a
French Catholic priest in a time of official persecution of Protestants, converted to Calvinism and
fled to Geneva; heretics such as the Lollard Walter Brut defended women's authority to preach,
teach, and administer the sacraments. On the latter, see Blamires, Woman Defamed, 250.
35. See, e.g., Charity Cannon Willard, Christine de Pizan, Her Life and Works (New York:
Persea, 1984); Sheila Delany, "'Mothers to Think Back Through': Who are They? The Ambiguous
Example of Christine de Pizan," in Medieval Texts and Contemporary Readers, ed. Laurie A. Fink
and Martin Schichtman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 177-79; Christine Reno, "Christine
de Pizan: At Best a Contradictory Figure?" in Politics, Gender and Genre: The Political Thought of
Christine de Piran, ed. Margaret Brabant (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 171-91.
36. Cf. Waldo Martin, The Mind of Frederick Douglass (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1984), 25 n.25 ("whites became abolitionists out of choice; blacks were abolitionists
out of necessity").
37. Novella is said to have taught law, and Christine, justly described as a polyscribator, was
particularly concerned with the traditionally male field of political theory; Laura Cereta's interests
paralleled those of male humanists; Marie de Gournay held controversial views on the development
of the French language; Mary Astell was a theologian; and the women of the French Revolutionary
era wished for a role in shaping the new French state.
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heard.",38 At least initially, the women of the querelle may have wished
to change the world only as much as might be necessary to give themselves a voice.
Each may perhaps have been radicalized by her femaleness into doubting the established order as she realized that male authority was contradicted by her experiences as a woman. Certainly this is the path
Christine charts for her fictional persona in the City of Ladies. At the
beginning of that book, Christine the narrator is thrown into a deep
depression by her realization that all authorities "concur in one conclusion: that women are inclined to and full of every vice." The authority
of men causes her to "detest [her]self and the entire feminine sex" until
the personification of Reason reprimands her for putting less faith in "the
certainty of your own being" than in "what you do not know or see or
recognize except by virtue of a plurality of strange opinions." 39
Throughout the book, Christine follows this advice by repeatedly contrasting the negative pronouncements of male authorities with the positive female behavior she has personally observed. She responds
elsewhere to male critics of her partisanship and prejudice in favor of her
own sex: "My motive is merely to uphold the truth ... but as indeed I

am a woman, I can bear better witness to the truth than those who have
no experience of the state, but only speak through suppositions or in general terms."'
I do not propose to attempt to resolve the difficult epistemological
problem of the extent to which one should privilege testimony by a
speaker about that speaker personally or the group to which [s]he
belongs. I do, however, want to point out some analogies between the
constitution of woman's voice in the querelle and "voice" as that term
has recently come to be used in the legal academy. By the emphasis they

38. This is my own translation from Marie de Gournay, "Grief des Dames," in L'ombre de la
demoiselle de Gournay (Paris 1626). "Grief" is translated as "The Ladies' Grievance," in Women
Writers of the Seventeenth Century, 23-26.
39. City of Ladies, 1.1.2, 1.2.2.
40. Letter to Jean de Montreuil, Provost of Lille, trans. Charity Cannon Willard, in Medieval
Women Writers, ed. Katharina M. Wilson (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984), 344. This
letter forms part of an extensive debate over the Romance of the Rose, which Christine condemned
for its negative portrayal of women. Accused by the book's defenders of being a prude, Christine in
this debate may be seen instead as a precursor of the MacKinnon-Dworkin view of pornography.
She comes very close to asking, with MacKinnon, "if a woman is subjected, why should it matter
that the work has other value?" Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 202; Letter to Montreuil, 345. For a collection of the
documents in the debate in English translation, see La Querelle de la Rose: Letters and Documents,
ed. Joseph Baird and John Kane (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages,
1978). Christine's emphasis on the authority of personal experience permeates her contribution to
the Rose debate. See, e.g., Querelle de la Rose, 95, 143; cf. Richard Delgado, "The Imperial
Scholar," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132 (1984): 565 ("I pointed out that although
Frank Michelman may be a superb scholar and teacher, he probably has relatively little firsthand
knowledge of withered self-concepts").
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place on "when and where I enter"4 (with "I" signifying the speaker
both as perceiving subject and as member of a marginalized group), the

female authors of the querelle echo the concerns not only of their modern
counterparts but also, I believe, those of critical race theorists. Compare,
for example, the voice of Christine with that of Richard Delgado in "The
Imperial Scholar" and "Does Voice Really Matter?"4 2 Both are confronted with the problem of exclusion from the discourse about them-

selves when they eagerly turn from professional research on other
subjects to face a stack of reading specifically about their group. In
Christine's case, a borrowed book she picks up for relaxation after a hard
day of study does not, as promised, speak well of women's worth, but
rather, like the treatises of so many different learned men, accuses them

of a multitude of faults and deficiencies. This is for her the last straw; she
is overwhelmed by the discrepancy between her own view of women and
that of the many men who purport to write authoritatively about
women's nature.43 Delgado, newly tenured, for the first time feels free to
do work on civil rights; when he asks his research assistant to bring him
the twenty leading articles in the field he is at first puzzled to see that
they are not only all written by white men but also cite no minority
scholarship.
The question both Christine and Delgado then pose is "what difference
does it make if the scholarship about the rights of group A is written by
members of group B?" 4 As Christine puts it in her "Letter to the God
of Love," "The books were not composed by women nor did they record
the things one may read against them .... Yet men write on.... the ones
who plead their cause without debate .... If women, though, had written
all those books, I know that they would read quite differently for well do
women know the blame is wrong. The parts are not apportioned equally,
because the strongest take the largest cut and he who slices can keep the
best."' 45 For both race and sex, there is no neutral, disinterested standpoint; a double distortion results when one side simultaneously dominates the discourse and obscures its own partiality. As a corrective, both
41. I take this phrase from the title of the book by Paula Gidding, When and Where I Enter The
Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America (New York: Bantam, 1984).
42. Richard Delgado, "When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?" Virginia Law
Review 95 (1990): 95.
43. The book is a French translation of the late thirteenth-century Latin work, Lamentationsof
Matheolus. The progress from Matheolus to Christine can be read as a microcosm of the querelle in
that it is one from male misogynist author to male defender of women to female feminist. Matheolus
was a cleric who blamed his marriage to a widow for all the troubles in his life and wrote a virulently
misogynistic warning to other men tempted to follow his example. His Lamentations were
translated into French in 1371 by Jean Le Fhvre, who accompanied them with his own apologetic
defense of women in Le Livre de Leesce which includes the story of Novella cited above. When
Christine's source informed her Matheolus spoke well of women, [s]he doubtless had in mind Le
Fivre's accompanying text.
44. Delgado, "The Imperial Scholar," 566, quoting Derrick Bell.
45. Christine de Pizan, "Epistre au Dieu d'Amours" ll. 409-18, in Poems of Cupid, God of Lave,
ed. Thelma S. Fenster and Mary Carpenter Erler (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 55.
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Delgado and Christine seek to give authority to the experience of the
marginalized."' Like Delgado's marginalized scholars, Christine is "able
to tell stories different from the ones legal scholars normally hear." With
her privileged access to the experience of being a woman and to the
voices of other women, she can provide useful, concrete correctives to the
misogynists' overgeneralizations.47
Christine here exemplifies the technique Matsuda has dubbed "looking
to the bottom;" she "inform[s] abstract reason with concrete experience"
as a means, not only of combatting the views of opponents, but of enriching and making more useful the discourse of supporters from within the
male elite. The relationship between critical legal studies and critical
race theory Matsuda describes thus parallels that between the male and
female feminists in the querelle: both C.L.S. and the male querelle
authors are open to the charge of being "frivolous;" their "alternative
tools of 'jokes and snippets' are revealed as inadequate standing alone:
they seem the stuff of child's play-something merely to amuse while the
dangerous knife [of critical analysis] remains safely in the drawer."
Adding the voice of experience, the voice "from the bottom," the voice of
the subordinated themselves to the abstract critique from the top is
important in order for both the querelle and "the C.L.S. movement to
maintain a credible and effective praxis along with its deeply critical
stance, . . . to move beyond trashing into the next stage of
48
reconstruction."
The corrective technique Christine, like Matsuda, endorses comes
close to that of consciousness-raising as practiced in the 1970s and as
theorized by Catharine MacKinnon. That is, Christine begins by comparing the male experts' view of women with her own "character and
conduct" and that of "other women ...princesses, great ladies, women
of the middle and lower classes, who had graciously told me of their most
private and intimate thoughts ...." Though, like MacKinnon's women,
"pushed to see reality in [male] terms," she, too, becomes aware that
"this denies their vantage point as women in that it contradicts at least
some of their lived experience ....
At first glance, Christine, like the critical race theorists, may have
46.

Delgado speaks favorably of social sciences in which "minority status constitutes virtually a

presumption of expertise." Delgado, "The Imperial Scholar," 564.
47. While the voices of the women of the querelle themselves are those of elite women, their
focus is not exclusively on the problems women of their class may have in gaining access and respect

in the public sphere. Christine, for example, includes the voices of poor women whose abusive
husbands spend the meager family income on drink, battered women (City 11.13.1, 11.23.2), and

women subject to rape (11.44.1) and sexual harassment (11.65.2). In each case, she uses the women's
voices to contradict what male authorities have said about women in their situation (e.g., that
women enjoy being raped). She urges change, not only in public opinion, but also in the law.
48. Mar Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations," Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 22 (1987): 331, 350-51.
49. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 114; see generally the chapters on
"Consciousness Raising" and "Method and Politics," 83-125.
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what to postmodern sensibilities may seem an overly simplistic view of
the emergence of the marginalized voice. There seems to be for her, as
there may not be for theorists such as MacKinnon, an "authentic"
female voice, which can be heard clear as a bell once women learn to
tune out the static of male discourse about them.5 0 Paradoxically, Christine uses a potentially multivalent parable to make this point: in counseling the narrator to cease privileging male authority over the authority of
her own intellect and experience, Reason tells her, "You resemble the
fool in the prank who was dressed in women's clothes while he slept;
because those who were making fun of him repeatedly told him he was a
woman, he believed their false testimony more than the certainty of his
own identity." A postmodern would read the fool's story quite differently-as evidence above all for the constructed nature of gender. But
for Christine, clothes do not make the man, or the woman; neither does
the cultural conditioning that go with them. There is an essential nature,
a "certainty" to one's own being, that may be occluded, but can never
quite vanish. Yet a woman's authentic identity need have no resemblance
to that which has been constructed for her-the voices of authority can
no more transform a man into a woman than they can transform a
woman into their negative image of her.
Although Christine may take "experience as the origin of all knowledge," 5 1 as Joan Wallace Scott criticizes historians for doing, she does
not quite leave aside "questions about the constructed nature of experience, about how subjects are constituted as different in the first place,
about how one's vision is structured." 52 After all, her narrator comes
perilously close to internalizing the male authorities' vision of women as
"vile creature[s],. . . an abominable work.... monstrosities in nature."5 3
Moreover, she repeatedly insists on the situatedness of all perspectives,
50. See Ruth Colker, "Feminism, Sexuality and Self," Boston University Law Review 68 (1988):
221 n.8 (quoting MacKinnon as saying she found the concept of an authentic self "unhelpful").
MacKinnon's image, by contrast, is that of "his foot on her throat," denying women "the power to
develop what our [values] really would be." Even if the foot should be removed, the vocal cords
might remain bruised, bearing the marks of oppression. MacKinnon is thus reluctant to identify
women with any voice we now can hear. For her, it may be "male dominance that has created
people in these images." For her, then, sexism may, for now at least, run deep and ineradicable,
contaminating even the most thoroughly raised consciousness in this male-dominated society: "[N]o
interior ground and few if any aspects of life are free from male power." See DuBois, Dunlap,
Gilligan, MacKinnon and Menkel-Meadows, "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A
Conversation" Buffalo Law Review 34 (1985): 11; MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the
State, 116.
51. "Nothing gives one so much authority as one's own experience. Hence, in this case I can
speak the truth from certain knowledge." Christine de Pizan to Pierre Col, Querelle de la Rose, 143.
52. See Joan Wallace Scott, "'Experience,'" in Feminists Theorize the Political, ed. Judith
Butler and Joan Wallace Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 22-40. Like many postmodern or
deconstructionist scholars, Scott might criticize Christine's as an overly simple, comfortable, and
limiting view of difference.
53. Before dismissing this negative reaction as mere false consciousness, it is important to note
that it occurs after Christine has observed, in what may be deemed a consciousness raising session
with other women (cited above), the great discrepancy between the authorities' view of women and
women's own experience.

HeinOnline -- 5 Yale J.L. & Human. 130 1993

1993]

Case

male as well as female. Though her culture insisted that women were
defined and limited by their bodies, embodying the physical, incarnating
carnality, Christine never lets us forget that men, too, inhabit bodies and
that their opinions of women are similarly embodied and partial. 4
The epistemological progress charted by Christine's narrator closely
parallels what a group of psychologists have called "women's ways of
knowing.""5 She begins at what they call the stage of" 'received knowledge' where [she] believe[s] that truth comes from experts;" becoming
aware that the experts contradict her own experience of being female, she
progresses to the stage of" 'subjective knowledge,' where [she] learn[s] to
trust [her] inner sense." 56 But she does not stop there. As the personification of Reason leads her to apply the misogynists' own methodology to
debunk them, she enters what they describe as the stage of "procedural
knowledge" denominated "the voice of Reason." Both in seeking contextual explanations for the misogynists' views and in listening to the
voices and experiences of other women, she engages in the "separate and
connected knowing" which, for these psychologists, is the second stage of
"procedural knowledge." Finally, as her city is built and she can usher
women into its shelter, Christine achieves what Belenky et al. call "constructed knowledge" by "integrating the voices" of "personal experience
...

with a newfound capacity to evaluate and discriminate." 57
TECHNIQUES OF THE QUERELLE

The epistemological progress of the women of the querelle was, in a
sense, the reverse of the men's. The more radical of the men of the querelle were no less skeptical of received authority than the women. But
whereas the women seemed to have learned skepticism from the discrepancy between their own experience and authoritative pronouncements on
women, 8 the men generally began with a broadly based inclination
toward scepticism and then applied it to received wisdom on women as
54. For example, Christine used biographical data to explain the particular biases of certain male
authors. Ovid, she noted, was castrated for his amorous indiscretions, Aristotle was deformed; of
medieval misogynists, Cecco d'Ascoli was a homosexual and Matheolus impotent: no wonder these
authors sought to malign the female sex; since they could not enjoy healthy relationships with
women, they sought to spoil the fun for others. City of Ladies, 1.9.2.
55. Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck
Tarule, Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self Voice, and Mind (New York: Basic
Books, 1986).
56. As with Christine, for the women in the Belenky et al. survey "the turning point often was a
vividly remembered, precise moment in time." Ibid., 56. They, too, then come to experience
"conflict between the absolute dictates of the authorities and the women's own subjectivism" first as
"an attempt to stifle their inner voice." Ibid., 88.
57. I have adapted my summary of women's ways of knowing from Lorraine Code, What Can
She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991), 252 n.54.

58. The exception may be Gournay, who applies the established skeptical methods of her
covenant father Montaigne.
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to a test case. 59

The querelle authors all begin by reacting against a misogynist tradition in which male authors rely in large part on the authority conferred
by their maleness and on universal consensus to prove women's inferiority. For the misogynists, male authors are presumptively to be valued,
women's voices presumptively to be discounted (they lack authority, they
are "only women"). But the cumulative result of the work of the male
and the female defenders of women comes close to reversing all these
notions of authority.' The male authors, true to their skeptical roots,
used reasoned argument to undermine the authority, both of other men
and of general consensus; they demonstrated that the misogynists,
though more likely to believed, are not more likely to be right. The
women then used the new authority of their own experience to prove
their case; instead of being discounted, the women's voices thus become
privileged as the male voices lose their privilege.
As long as readers continued to be persuaded by quotations from
famous male authors, however, the authors of the querelle had to move
beyond their personal skepticism to confront or exploit authority.61 Some
sought to deal the misogynists a death-blow by turning their own weapons against them. Thus Marie de Gournay, acknowledging that men are
rarely persuaded by a woman's reasoning, no matter how flawless, undertook to prove the equality of the two sexes "only by referring to the
authority of God himself... and of the great men who served as guiding
lights to the universe. ,62 As Matsuda has noted, "[t]his ability to adopt
and transform standard text and mainstream consciousness is an important contribution of those on the bottom. ' 63 Taking a contrary tack,
other feminist writings sought to undermine authorities by calling into
question their accuracy, their motivation or their freedom from cultural
bias. Jean le FRvre casually dismissed some of the most outrageously
6
misogynistic authorities as lying, mistaken, or garbled in transmission. 1
59. Agrippa's most famous and controversial work De Vanitate (On the Vanity and Uncertainty
of the Sciences), also a declamation, was condemned by several theological faculties for its skeptical
attacks on established authorities and the moral order. See Charles G. Nauert, Jr., Agrippa and the
Crisis of Renaissance Thought (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965). Poulain, a Cartesian,
explicitly chose "the commonly held belief in the inequality of the two sexes" as a test of his
principles, "so that after demonstrating that an opinion as ancient as the world, as widespread as the
earth, and as universal as the human species is a prejudice or an error, knowledgeable people will
finally be convinced of the necessity of judging things (after having carefully examined them) for
themselves and of not abiding by the opinions or testimonies of others if they want to avoid being
deceived." Poulain, Equality, 5.
60. Indeed, the querelle provides examples of all the various possible forms of fallacious and
valid arguments from authority and ad hominem arguments.
61. In the same way, the women of the 1964 House could exploit Smith as an authority, letting
his endorsement attract the support of many more male Representatives than the women themselves
could have won over.
62. Gournay, "Equality," in Women Writers of the Seventeenth Century, 16.
63. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, 335 (describing how "Black Americans ... have turned the
Bible and the Constitution into texts of liberation.").
64. For other methods of reinterpreting authority, see, e.g., Jane Anger, Her Protection for
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In the seventeenth-century heyday of cultural relativism, Gournay and
Poulain insisted that even such an unshakeable authority as the Bible was
completely applicable only, if at all, to the time in which it was written;
its authors' horizons were limited by the customs of their own time and
its prescriptions and descriptions thus do not necessarily have a universal
applicability.6 5
While the men of the querelle come from a variety of backgrounds, the
lives of the women follow more of a pattern. They saw in themselves a
"natural inclination toward learning"" that informed their behavior
from an early age. Most were eldest children (Novella, Christine, Cereta,
and Gournay) and were encouraged in this love of learning by a father to
whom they were quite close (Novella, Christine, and Cereta) or by a
more distant, admired father-figure (Gournay by Montaigne, and
Olympe de Gouges indirectly by the man she claimed was her natural
father, the poet Le Franc de Perpignan). By contrast, their mothers and
the women around them often attempted to prevent them from engaging
in "unfeminine" pursuits, perhaps out of fear the girls would grow into
misfits, perhaps out of envy or a firmly inculcated sense of female inferiority. Christine cites as "the major obstacle to [her] being more involved
in learning" "the opinion of [her] mother ...who wished to keep [her]
busy with spinning and silly girlishness." 6 Maternal opposition forced
Gournay to teach herself Latin and Greek in secret. Her mother prescribed a sedative to cure her of her enthusiasm for Montaigne's Essays
and only accepted Gournay's high opinion of them after it was seconded
by distinguished male authors. Accused by some women of passing off
her father's Latin epistles as her own, ignored by others to whom she
wrote for support, Laura Cereta directed one of her bitterest invectives
against "women who disparage learned women."'6 Thus, early personal
experience helped many of the women realize that men were not the only
ones who needed to be convinced of women's worth.
Among the women they needed to convince were not only those who,
like their mothers, shunned education and achievement, but also many of
their most learned and prolific female contemporaries. These other
accomplished women allowed themselves to be isolated on a pedestal
Women (1589), excerpted in By a Woman Writt, ed. June Goulianos (Baltimore: Penguin, 1974), 27
(misogynists' proverbs stood on their heads).
65. See, e.g., Gournay, Equality, Proumenoir (Paris 1589) in which, among other things, she
speculates on what would have happened if Jesus Christ, Socrates, and St. Paul had been female and
therefore subject to the restrictions placed on women in their culture.
66. City of Ladies, 11.36.4.
67. Ibid.
68. Letter to Lucilia Vernacula in Her Immaculate Hand, ed. Margaret L. King and Albert
Rabil, Jr. (Binghampton: SUNY, 1983), 85-86. Similarly, some critical race theorists find
themselves in bitter opposition, not only to the white power structure, but to blacks "willing to
minimize the effects of racism" and disparage other blacks. See, e.g., the third and fourth "Rules of
Racial Standing" in Derrick Bell, Facesat the Bottom of the Well, (New York: Basic Books, 1992),
114-25.
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from the rest of their sex. Succumbing to the dangerous flattery of men
who called them "marvels," "prodigies," "extraordinary," "miraculous,"
"exceptional," even "freaks of nature," they often denied that other
women could or should follow their example. Thus, Anna Laetitia
Barbauld, an eighteenth century English bluestocking, after recommending that women not be sent to school, but rather that they learn
only what their husbands or brothers choose to teach them, observed,
"[Y]ou may think that having myself stepped out of the bonds of female
reserve in becoming an author, it is with an ill grace I offer these sentiments, but my situation has been peculiar, and I would offer no rule for
others.",69 By contrast, the women of the querelle insisted that their own
achievements, like those of all other "extraordinary" women, should be
seen as exemplary, not exceptional. They saw the potential for themselves and other women inherent in the achievements of great women of
the past. They also saw the danger in acknowledging themselves to be
"extraordinary." "You pretend to admire me as a female prodigy,"
wrote Laura Cereta, "but there lurks sugared deceit in your adulation.
You wait perpetually in ambush to entrap my lovely sex ... [S]howing
your contempt for women, you pretend that I alone am admirable
because of the good fortune of my intellect.... Do you suppose, 0 most
contemptible man on earth, that I think myself sprung from the head of
Jove? I am a school girl, possessed of the sleeping embers of an ordinary
mind... conscious of my obligation to defend my sex. For absolutely
everything-that which is within us and that which is without-is made
weak by association with my sex."70
What the early feminists of both sexes realize, what both the self-consciously exceptional woman and the misogynists7 ' seem to miss, is the
true relationship between the exception and the rule. The exception does
indeed prove the rule, not in the colloquial, corrupted sense of reaffirming it, but in the original, proper sense of testing its limits. For the feminists, there are no monstrosities in nature,72 the behavior of any woman
is that of "a natural woman," so that if even one woman x, then women x
(with x a placeholder for any activity traditionally closed to women as
beyond their capacity, from leading an army, to ruling a state, to producing great literature or art or philosophy, to keeping a secret). Such a
woman becomes not an exception, but an exemplar. This may explain
69. Works XVIII-XIX, quoted in Marilyn Williamson, "Who's Afraid of Mrs. Barbauld?"
InternationalJournal of Women's Studies 3 (1980).
70. Laura Cereta to Bibulus Sempronius, Her Immaculate Hand, 81-84.
71. And the occasional federal judge-see Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley,
J., concurring) ("It is true that many women are... not affected by any of the duties, complications
and incapacities of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule.... And the rules
of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based on
exceptional cases").
72. Cf. Michel de Montaigne, Essays (though "we call contrary to nature what is contrary to
custom, nothing is anything but according to nature").
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the tendency of many querelle texts to degenerate into catalogues of
famous women. For the misogynists, such catalogues were collections of
the monstrous, like the "Wunderkammer" so beloved of Renaissance collectors. But for the feminists, the existence of a single woman who succeeded in any activity without extraordinary divine intervention proved
conclusively that such an activity was within the natural capacities of
womankind. If the assertion is, as it so often seems to be, in the form of a
universal generalization-"women don't" or "women can't" or "women
are"-even a single counterexample suffices to disprove the assertion.
Such an example can have powerful persuasive force, both logically and
rhetorically.73 It is thus, in my view, the nature of their opponents'
claim, more than any presumed tendency for women to prefer narrative
and the concrete to analysis and the abstract, that causes the writers of
the querelle, both male and female, to focus on the concrete experiences
and narrative histories of individual women.
BUILDING ON THE QUERELLE

When Christine laid the groundwork for her City, she set it in the
Field of Letters and used as building blocks the women of the past. I
believe we modem feminists would do well to follow her example. That
is to say, I agree with Maureen Quilligan, commentator for this panel,
who in the introduction to her recent book on The City of Ladies, said,
"The Cit6 [together, I would add, with other major works of the querelle,] deserves to enter our canon. We have no hope of having it take its
place there if it is not allowed to speak past history to our own murky
understanding of contemporary problems." '74

73. Even the appellate court in E.E.O.C v. Sears Roebuck, 839 F.2d 302, 311 (7th Cir. 1988)
acknowledged the power of individual anecdotal counterexamples. In that notorious case, the
defendant successfully argued that women generally lacked interest in commission sales jobs.
Testimony was confined to experts (albeit themselves female) talking about women; no woman who
had been kept from the disputed job was called to testify as to her interest in it. "we do not agree
that examples of individual instances of discrimination must be numerous to be meaningful," said
the appeals court. "Even a few examples would have helped to bring 'cold numbers' convincingly to
life."
74. Maureen Quilligan, The Allegory of Female Authority: Christine de Pizan's Citd des Dames
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 7.
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